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POLITICA'L SCIENCE

Utilization of County Boundaries ,n Drawing
Legislative Districts
DR. ROBERT

A.

BARRETT*

ABSTRACT - Analysis of the traditional and contemporary arguments on county lines as a basis
of drawing state legislative districts appears to indicate that in a state such as Minnesota, with
large number of counties and extreme variations between them, county boundary lines should
not be accorded primary consideration in drawing legislative districts if compliance is sought with
the "one - man, one - vote" constitutional principle. Minnesota government officials faced with
reapportioning the state's legislative districts need to determine the role that county boundary
lines should fulfill in their decision. This paper was prepared originally al the request of the
Minnesota Governor's Reapportionment Commission.

A commonly-held but erroneous impression regarding
Minnesota legislative districts is that district lines have
always followed county boundary lines. When the 1959
Minnesota apportionment created new state senate districts, fully one-third contained only portions of counties
and nearly one-half contained two or more counties.
Roughly only one-sixth of the state senate distircts contained exclusive one-county areas. In the lower house
it is a frequent occurrence to find legislative districts occupying only portions of a county.
Another frequent misconception is that portions of
one county cannot be grouped with other counties to
form a legislative district. The 1959 Minnesota apportionment provided for three such instances covering the
27th, 28th, and 61 st state senate districts. Previously the
1913 Minnesota apportiompent also had provided for
three such instances in the 45th, 46th, and 47th state
senate districts.
Contrary to popular belief, no restriction exists in
Minnesota law prohibiting the division of counties or the
grouping of several counties or portions thereof into state
legislative districts. In fact, if counties were not grouped
together, it might well be argued that existing counties
should be consolidated in order to comply with constitutional requirements: "With enough county consolidation,
a rule of at least one member for each county might
conceivably be retained." (David and Eisenberg, 1961).
Only a dozen of the 50 states have more counties than
the 87 in Minnesota. Such an abundance poses a redistricting dilemma in that the great population extremes
make difficult the convenient groupings of counties into
legislative districts which meet constitutional apportionment standards.
The Rationale for County Lines
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racy and Apportionment Theory, 1963, suggested several potential factors of representation, including terrain,
governmental groupings, ethnic differences, community
or neighborhood groupings, economic similarities, political-historical traditions, and others, that might be accommodated through an apportionment standard based
upon territorial survey, governmental boundaries, official
bodies, functional divisions of the population, or free
population alignments. Of these, territorial surveys ( the
division of the population into contiguous districts composed of equal numbers of voters) are the " most common in modern times ."
But, observed deGrazia:
Corporate or collegial bodies, such as American state legislatures, also use the criterion of
governmental boundaries in apportioning seats.
A favored device of early American state governments was to apportion seats solely according to the county and town boundaries in one
or both houses of the state legislature. This
procedure was abandoned in most state governments, on grounds that it invariably and openly
worked to the disadvantage of governmental
units of heavy population density.
At another point, deGrazia made a strong presentation
in favor of utilizing governmental boundaries with these
words:
To maximize local influences and community
spirit, apportionment should be based on local
units of government, as was originally the case
in a number of American states and is presently the case in several. Then all the electorate
of a given locale, who are possessed already of
a degree of solidarity from economic, social and
political causes, will project that solidarity into
the . . . state legislature and reinforce it
thereby. Since many "natural" units of local
governments are divided or combined in the
geometry of apportionment, the full impact of
localism on state . . . legislatures is less than
it might otherwise be. Nevertheless, territorial
surveys that produce . . . a "contiguous and
compact territory containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants" will
provide a considerable reflection of local interests.
In their respective essays, Baker (Reapportionment,
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1960) and David and Eisenberg argue that frontier conditions of isolation and poor communications provided
a rationale for the representation of counties as units.
Such representation did little violence to the equal representation principle when the distribution of a state's
inhabitants was fairly uniform and counties were roughly
comparable.
"With the long-term trend toward the concentration
of population in urban areas, the county pattern of representation has become less appropriate, but it has been
maintained or even manipulated primarily to preserve the
political power of rural interests," according to David
and Eisenberg.
The technological factor is frequently raised as justification for affording greater representation to non-urban areas. DeGrazia argued that the multiplicity of
sources for conveying opinions and desires in densely
settleds areas - mass media, offices of government, offices of public utilities, and other facilities - make resort
to politicians less frequent.
The court, in the case of Reynolds vs. Simms, directly
rebutted this "technological" rationale with the following
statement:
But neither history alone, nor economic or
other sorts of group interests are permissible
factors in attempting to justify disparities from
population-based representation. Citizens, not
history or economic interests cast votes. Considerations of area alone provide an insufficient
justification for deviations from the equalpopulations principle. Again, people, not land
or trees or pastures, vote. Modern developments and improvements in transportation and
communications make rather hollow, in the
mid-1960's most claims that deviations from
population-based representation can validly be
based on geographical considerations. Arguments for allowing such deviations in order to
insure effective representation for sparsely settled areas and to prevent legislative districts
from becoming so large that the availability of
access of citizens to their representatives is impaired are today, for the most part unconvincing.
However telling the court's refutation of deGrazia's
thesis might be, it does not shut the door to the representation of political subdivisions as such. The court
asserted in Reynolds vs. Simms that a state can "rationally consider according political subdivisions some
independent representation . . . as long as the basic
standard of equality of population among districts is
maintained." This opinion might be interpreted to permit states to specify consideration of political subdivisions within their respective constitutions, which Minnesota's constitution specifically does not provide. To
"maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions
insofar as possible," in the court's words, might countenance respecting city, village, town, township, or county
boundaries wherever feasible. The only permissible consideration in the Minnesota constitution alludes to "sections" that are to be so arranged in an apportionment
system as to produce equal populations. "Sections" might
Journal of, Volume Thirty-six, No. 1, 1969

mean units of one square mile, townships, towns, villages, wards, precincts, cities, or counties.
Ultimately, one must address the most common argument advanced in behalf of county units: their assumed
role as natural and viable communities.
To a legislator, lawyer, or politician, the county appears to be of considerable import. He perceives the
county as the unit for collecting vital statistics, recording
property transactions, maintenance of tax rolls, issuing
of legal documents, and other record-keeping and legal
transactions. But his is a distorted perception not shared
equally by the electorate or general populace. That his
attorney travels to the county seat to complete a legal
transaction is given little cognizance by the citizen. It
may properly be suggested that the citizen possesses a
far greater attachment to his local community be it city,
village, town, township, or school district. Baker's examination of the subject concluded that "realistically, it
is hard to defend the notion that county lines, for example, denote real communities."
Implicit in the argument of representing counties as
natural communities is an assertion that they enjoy a
position comparable to the states in the federal system.
The "federal analogy" fails, however, because the states
existed as sovereign units prior to the union. They authorized establishment of the union and state sovereignty
enabled them to demand geographical representation in
the U.S. Senate as a constitutional compromise. Counties enjoy no such relationship in theory, law, or common sense. States are unitary and not federal in composition; and counties are mechanical (administrative)
rather than sovereign subdivisions. Counties are created
as agents of the state and can be altered or abolished,
unlike federal units. Few counties have historic identities;
they merely represent administrative devices for performing certain state functions at the local level (highways,
law enforcement, record keeping, welfare, etc.) The
county is legally classified as a municipal quasi-corporation lacking even the self-governing authority of the village or city and in no manner paralleling the legally
sovereign position of states in the federal organization.
Confronting the rationale of the federal analogy in apportioning districts on a county basis, the United States
Supreme Court stated in Reynolds vs. Simms:
We find the federal analogy inapposite and irrelevant to state apportionment arrangements
. . . The system of rnpresentation in the two
houses of the Federal Congress . . . is based
on the consideration that in establishing our
type of federalism a group of formerly independent states bound themselves together under one national government . . . Political
subdivisions of states - counties, cities or whatever - never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities."
Nor does Minnesota's state constitution make any
provision for a federal analogy.
The Division of Counties

If Minnesota state legislative districts are to be drawn
in compliance with the "one-man, one-vote" standards
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required by both the state and federal constitutions,
county boundary lines will of necessity have to be accorded only momentary consideration. The informed
consensus of reapportionment observers supports this
conclusion, as indeed did one of the state legislators in
orai testimony before the Governor's Reapportionment
Commission on October 1, 1964. That legislator remarked that it is a necessity to divide counties and group
counties if any attempt is to be made at improvement.
Belle Zeller, in her recognized classic which culminated
a four-year study by the American Political Science Association, (American State Legislatures, 1954) noted the
following:
Political units (counties) . . . pose puzzling
and difficult problems that render inadvisable
their use as representative areas. The unitary
character of the American state governments
would seem to render unnecessary the representation of units of local government as such.
Moreover, counties and towns as units of local
government have largely lost the significance
they once had and are no longer vital rural
communities with independent and distinctive
interests of their own. Of much greater importance are the larger areas or sections of our
states.
It should immediately be recognized that counties are
constantly divided for a variety of purposes such as the
Minnesota legislative districts. Under these conditions,
county election officials sometimes must prepare different
ballots and conduct separate ballot counts for parts of
counties in different legislative districts. Candidates for
office campaign in, and state legislators represent different portions of the same county.
Moreover, cities, which are infinitely more viable u 'ts
of self government than counties, are commonly divided
and / or combined with other municipalities or counties
for the purposes of state legislative districts. Such is the
case in several communities of Hennepin, St. Louis, and
Ramsey counties. For county commission districts, also,
individual Hennepin County municipalities have been
purposely divided and grouped with adjacent municipalities as provided for by the county commission and sanctioned by the state legislature in 1963.
The argument of indivisibility also proves critically
deficient when applied to the cities of St. Cloud and
Mankato. No county could profess to be a more "natural
community" than either of those municipalities. Yet, by
virtue of following county lines, the legislature in the
1913 and again in the 1959 apportionment laws split the
natural community of St. Cloud into two artificial communities that presupposed a stronger affinity between
portions of St. Cloud and the respective counties than
for the city at large. Correspondingly, the 1913 apportionment law divided the city of Mankato and paired
each section with adjacent portions of different counties
in an "artificial community" rather than as a more natural city community.
However "inapposite and irrelevant" counties might
be to the equal representation of citizens in the state leg34

islature, it would be folly to dismiss lightly consideration
of them entirely. For if compeUing circumstances do not
dictate otherwise, "legislators are overwhelmingly persuaded that district lines should have some relation to
other existing communities and jurisdictions." ( Gordon
E. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political Power, 1955).
And, as Baker later observed:
While county government as an administrative
unit may often seem weak, the county ruling
clique as a political force is unusually strong.
Its lines of responsibility and accountability to
the public are correspondingly weak . . . The

close political ties between the county officers
and legislative candidates of ten result in a 'sacred cow' position for the county.
A Reapportionment Caveat

A persuasive argument might be made that legislative district draftsmen have traditionally started from the
wrong set of assumptions. Normally, they have designated an ideal district size (50,953 population in the
Minnesota Senate and 25,288 in the Minnesota House)
and then grouped counties and subdivisions into districts
approaching the ideal.
In this connection it can be suggested that the drafters
should delineate an ideal size below which no district
could be established. The drafting problem would then
shift from the present one of grouping together a sufficient number of counties to approach a maximum ideal
size to a new problem of paring down various groupings
to reach a minimum ideal size. The practical result of
such a transformation would be to place the common
barriers to "equal population" apportionment in a disadvantageous category. For example, if a given group of
counties were reluctant to permit their boundaries to be
violated in creating legislative districts, holding their
boundaries inviolate as "natural communities," their reluctance would result in less representation per capita for
those counties. They would, in effect, be expressing a
preference for the inviolate character of ,their "natural
communities" to the principal of "equal-population"
representation.
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